Abstract. In this work we re-examine two common modulus attacks on RSA. First, we show that Guo's continued fraction attack works much better in practice than previously expected. Given three instances of RSA with a common modulus N and private exponents each smaller than N 0:33 , the attack can factor the modulus about 93% of the time in practice. The success rate of the attack can be increased up to almost 100% by including a relatively small exhaustive search. Next, we consider Howgrave-Graham and Seifert's lattice-based attack and show that a second necessary condition for the attack exists that limits the bounds (beyond the original bounds) once n 7 instances of RSA are used. In particular, by construction, the attack is limited to private exponents at most N 0:5 , given sufficiently many instances, instead of the original bound of N 1 . In addition, we also consider the effectiveness of the attacks when mounted against multi-prime RSA and Takagi's variant of RSA. For multi-prime RSA, we show three (or more) instances with a common modulus and private exponents smaller than N 1=3 is unsafe. For Takagi's scheme, we show that three or more instances with a common modulus N D p t q is unsafe when all the private exponents are smaller than N 2=.3.t C1// . The results, for both variants, is obtained using Guo's method and are almost always successful with the inclusion of a small exhaustive search. When only two instances are available, Howgrave-Graham and Seifert's attack can be successfully mounted on multiprime RSA, with r primes in the modulus, when the private exponents are both smaller than N .3Cr/=7r .
Introduction
The RSA cryptosystem [20] is the most widely known and widely used public-key cryptosystem in the world today. It is well known, however, that RSA is insecure when the private exponent is too small. Wiener's famous continued fraction attack [24] can be used to efficiently factor the modulus when the private exponent is smaller than N 1=4 , where N is the RSA modulus, and Boneh and Durfee's lattice-based attack [2] shows that private exponents up to N 0:2929 should be considered unsafe also. The latter result is an asymptotic bound, but experiments have broken instances of RSA with private exponents up to about N 0:28 and recent work [21] shows that private exponents up to N 0:3 are vulnerable (for 1024-bit N ) given some exhaustive search.
The bounds on the private exponent can be increased considerably when there are two or more instances RSA, having the same modulus, with small private exponents. An unpublished attack by Guo (described in [9] ) can be used to efficiently factor the (common) modulus, with some non-negligible probability, when three instances of RSA, each with private exponents smaller than N 1=3 , are given. A stronger attack, by Howgrave-Graham and Seifert [9] , can be used when given two or more instances of RSA with a common modulus. For example, the attack works for private exponents up to N 0:357 , given only two instances and for private exponents up to N 0:4 given three instances. Howgrave-Graham and Seifert's attack is a heuristic lattice-based attack, relying on an assumption about the lattices used, but is observed to work well in practice.
In this work we re-examine both Guo's and Howgrave-Graham and Seifert's common modulus attacks. Our original intent was simply to extend these attacks to multi-prime RSA and Takagi's scheme, however, in doing so, we also made some interesting observations about the original attacks on RSA. First, we noticed that Guo's attack is expected to be much more successful than originally suggested. This follows by using all of the information available and including some small exhaustive searches. This improvement is shown to hold in practice as well. Next, we observe that the bounds in Howgrave-Graham and Seifert's attack are overly optimistic when there are more than six instances of RSA with a common modulus. In particular, we show that there is a second necessary condition that limits the attack when there are many instances. Finally, and achieving our original goal, we show that multi-prime RSA and Takagi's scheme are vulnerable to common modulus attacks as well. Somewhat surprising, we find that Guo's attack works much better for multi-prime RSA (given three or more instances) than Howgrave-Graham and Seifert's attack which is opposite to the case of RSA. In addition, the strength of the attack on multi-prime RSA (i.e., the bounds on the private exponent) are the same as that for RSA. This is in contrast to all known attacks on multi-prime RSA (except for factoring). Also, we find that only Guo's attack can be used to attack Takagi's scheme. The strength of the attack (in theory and practice) depend on the structure of the modulus and decrease with increasing multiplicity of the prime p.
Motivation
When using RSA for both an encryption scheme and for a digital signature scheme, it is suggested by Ferguson and Schneier [6, §13.4.2] that instead of having two sets of keys 1 , each with a different modulus, that a single modulus should be used for the two (distinct) sets of keys. In this way, only two primes need to be generated and only one modulus needs to be stored for both keys. The same idea can be generalized to (arbitrary) multiple instances of RSA with a common modulus when a user requires several encryption (or signature) schemes. For example, a user may wish to have both professional and personal encryption and signature schemes; four instances of RSA in total.
Based on the best known small private exponent attacks on (single instance) RSA, a user may be tempted to use private exponents that are immune to these attacks but still relatively small in order to minimize decryption (signature generation) times. Howgrave-Graham and Seifert have shown, however, that private exponents exceeding the bounds by Boneh and Durfee (N 0:292 ) are insecure when two or more instances share a common modulus. In fact, they have shown that private exponents up to N 0:357 are unsafe when there are two instances sharing a common modulus (and stronger results for more instances).
There has been no consideration of the common modulus setting for multiprime RSA or for Takagi's scheme though. In order to better understand the security of these variants of RSA it is important to consider all possible attacks (just as with RSA).
Related work
This work is directly based on Guo's continued fraction attack and HowgraveGraham and Seifert's lattice based attack on common modulus RSA as described in [9] . Common modulus attacks have not been, to our knowledge, considered in the context of variants of RSA before.
There are some earlier common modulus attacks on RSA, by Simmons [22] and DeLaurentis [5] , but these attacks apply to the so-called common modulus protocol. In this early protocol many users share the same modulus and each user is not supposed to know the factorization. Since any user with a valid private exponent can compute the factorization of the modulus, however, this protocol is completely insecure. Here, we consider a single user who has two or more instances of RSA with a common modulus.
Contributions
The contributions of our work, in brief, are as follows.
(i) We show that Guo's continued fraction attack is much more effective in practice than previously thought.
(ii) We show that Guo's attack can be mounted on multi-prime (with the same strength as for RSA) and on Takagi's scheme with reduced bounds (depending on the form of the modulus).
(iii) We show that a second necessary condition for Howgrave-Graham and Seifert's lattice-based attack exists, which limits the strength of the attack for n 7 instances of RSA to private exponents smaller than N 1=2 .
(iv) We show that Howgrave-Graham and Seifert's attack can be mounted on multi-prime RSA (but not Takagi's scheme), but that once there are three instances of multi-prime RSA, Guo's attack is stronger.
Outline
The rest of the paper is as follows. In Section 2, we review the RSA cryptosystem and as well as the two fast variants we consider (multi-prime and Takagi's scheme). The tools needed for the attacks (continued fractions and lattices) are briefly reviewed in Section 3. We use Wiener's attack as an example to illustrate both techniques. In Section 4, we review Guo's continued fraction attack and present experimental data to show the effectiveness of the attack. In addition, we mount the attack on multi-prime RSA and Takagi's scheme. In Section 5, we review Howgrave-Graham and Seifert's lattice-based attack. We show that a secondary necessary condition for the attack exists that limits the effectiveness of the attack for n 7 instances of RSA. We also show the effectiveness of the attack when mounted on multi-prime RSA. Finally, we conclude with Section 6.
RSA and some fast variants
The RSA cryptosystem [20] is the most widely known and most widely used public key cryptosystem in the world. Let N D pq be the product of two large (distinct) primes and let e and d be inverses modulo .N / D lcm.p 1; q 1/. Thus, e and d satisfy the RSA key equation
where k is some positive integer. From this equation, notice that e and d are also inverses modulo the constant k so that gcd.d; k/ D 1. The value N is called the RSA modulus (or modulus for short), e is the public (encrypting) exponent and d is the private (decrypting) exponent. The public key is given by .e; N / and the private key is given by .d; p; q/. The exponents can actually be defined as inverses modulo any multiple of .N /. In fact, .N / D .p 1/.q 1/ D gcd.p 1; q 1/ .N / is the value used in the original presentation of RSA [20] and is often used in the presentation of many attacks. The reason that .N / is desirable, from the point of view of an attacker, is that
can be approximated as N minus a small correction term (s D p C q 1). When the primes are balanced, that is 1=2 < p=q < 2, we then have
and so N is a good approximation of .N /. We will only consider RSA with balanced primes. Given a plaintext message m 2 Z N , the ciphertext is computed as c D m e mod N and plaintext is recovered since c d mod N D m ed mod N D m. Thus encryption is simply a modular exponentiation of the plaintext with exponent e and decryption is a modular exponentiation of the ciphertext with exponent d . We will refer to decryption in this manner as standard decryption. To speed up decryption, however, we can first compute partial decryptions modulo p and modulo q and then combine them with the Chinese remainder theorem to recover the plaintext (see [19] 
where the time for exponentiations dominate the time and we ignore the cost for the initial reductions and final combining stages. The runtime can be reduced by another factor of two if we assume parallel computations. Thus, in theory, using CRT-decryption gives a decrease in decryption time by a factor of four.
In a typical instance of RSA with a small exponent the public exponent is expected to be roughly the same size as .N /. For randomly chosen balanced primes, it is expected that .N / .N / and so e N . We will assume that all public exponents for RSA (with small private exponent) satisfies this approximation. The strongest known small private exponent attack on (single instance) RSA is Boneh and Durfee's lattice-based attack [2] . The attack shows that private exponents smaller than N 0:2929 should be considered insecure. In practice, this bound can be increased with an additional exhaustive search. It was shown by Sarkar, Maitra and Sarkar [21] , for example, that private exponents up to N 0:3 can feasibly be recovered.
Multi-prime RSA
Multi-prime RSA is a variant of RSA in which the modulus is the product of three or more (distinct) primes. When the modulus is the product of r primes, N D p 1 p r , we call the system r-prime RSA. The public and private exponents are defined as inverses modulo .N / D .p 1 1/ .p r 1/. Encryption and standard decryption are exactly the same as with RSA (modular exponentiation with exponent e for encryption and d for decryption). CRT-decryption is a simple generalization of RSA. We compute the partial decryption modulo each of the r primes and then combine to recover the plaintext using the Chinese remainder theorem. For a fixed modulus size (bitlength), larger r implies smaller primes since each prime is roughly N 1=r when the primes are balanced. For private exponents smaller than each of the primes the expected number of binary operations for CRTdecryption is given by
Here the runtime can be reduced by another factor of r if we assume parallel computations. Thus, in theory, CRT-decryption with r-prime RSA should give a decrease in decryption time by a factor of r 2 compared to standard decryption (using the same assumptions as above for RSA). Of course, using too many primes in the modulus makes the elliptic curve method for factoring more efficient so a trade-off must be made. Balancing the expected complexity of factoring the modulus with the number field sieve and the elliptic curve method, the suggested maximum number of primes for several common modulus bitlengths are given in the following.
Modulus size (bits)
1024 2048 4096 8192
Maximum number of primes 3 3 4 5
As soon as more than this number of primes are in the modulus, the elliptic curve method is expected to factor the modulus faster than the number field sieve. For more details, see Lenstra [12] .
When all the primes in the modulus are pairwise balanced, which we will assume is always true, it can be shown (see [8] ) that
This value will be needed when extending Howgrave-Graham and Seifert's attack to multi-prime RSA.
In a typical instance of r-prime RSA with a small private exponent, the public exponent is expected to be roughly the same size as .N /. Again, since .N / N , we will use the approximation that e N for all public exponents for r-prime RSA (with small private exponent).
The strongest known small private exponent attack on (single instance) r-prime RSA is, again, Boneh and Durfee's lattice-based attack (as applied to multi-prime RSA). The extension of the attack to multi-prime RSA, by Ciet et al. [3] , shows that private exponents smaller than N 1 p 1 1=r should be considered insecure. For example, private exponents smaller than about N 0:1835 should be considered unsafe for 3-prime RSA, while private exponents smaller than about N 0:134 should be considered unsafe for 4-prime RSA. This trend, that attacks become weaker with increasing number of primes in the modulus, is common to all known attacks on multi-prime RSA except for factoring with the elliptic curve method (see Hinek [7] for more details about attacks on multi-prime RSA) and, as we shall see below, Guo's common modulus attack.
Takagi's scheme
Takagi's scheme [23] is another variant of RSA in which decryption costs are reduced. In this scheme, however, decryption is different from RSA (and even standard decryption does not apply). Here, the modulus has the form N D p t q, for some positive integer t > 1, and the public and private exponents are defined modulo 0 .N / D lcm.p 1; q 1/. [23] for full details.
The complexity of the Hensel lifting is dominated by the modular exponentiations, so (just considering the exponentiations), the expected number of binary operations is
Thus, when computing sequentially, decryption is faster than multi-prime RSA. In practice, Takagi has observed that decryption time for t D 2 with a 1024-modulus is about 42% faster than 3-prime RSA with a 1024-bit modulus. Just as with multi-prime RSA, the size of t must be balanced so that the modulus is not easily factored. The suggested maximum size of t is given by the suggested maximum size of r for multi-prime RSA letting t C 1 D r. If we assume parallel computations the decryption time will be essentially the same (when matching r D t C 1).
In a typical instance of Takagi's scheme with a small private exponent, the public exponent is expected to be roughly the same size as 0 .N / D lcm.p 1; q 1/. For randomly generated balanced primes, it is expected that lcm.p 1; q 1/ pq N 2=.tC1/ . We will use this approximation for all instances of Takagi's scheme with small private exponents.
The strongest known small private exponent attack on (a single instance of) Takagi's scheme is, yet again, a generalization of Boneh and Durfee's lattice-based attack on RSA. The generalization, due to Itoh, Kunihiro and Kurosawa [10] 
Continued fractions, lattices and Wiener's attack
In this section we review some of the mathematical results needed for the attacks. We assume the reader already has some familiarity with the topics and only review the needed results. To illustrate each topic (continued fractions and lattices) we briefly outline Wiener's small private exponent attack as implemented with each topic.
Continued fractions
We need only one main result from the theory of continued fractions (for more general information see Olds [18] ). The result is restated in the following theorem. Using this result, we review Wiener's small private exponent attack on RSA [24] (using Boneh's [1] approach). In order to simplify the presentation we will assume that the public and private exponents are defined modulo .N / instead of modulo .N / as in Wiener's original work. Let .e; N / be an instance of RSA with balanced primes and let d < 
and then dividing both sides by dN (and rearranging) to yield
Since jkj < jd j < 1 6 N 1=4 , and jp C q 1j < 3N 1=2 , notice thať
Therefore, from Theorem 3.1, it follows that c D k=d is one of the convergents in the continued fraction expansion of e=N . Finding this convergent exposes .N / since 1=k < 1 and
Once .N / D .p 1/.q 1/ is known the modulus is easily factored by solving the system .N / D .p 1/.q 1/ and N D pq. Since we don't know the correct convergent, we can simply try each one (computing a candidate for .N /) until the modulus is factored. Since the number of convergents is polynomial in log 2 .N / and all computations can be done in time polynomial in log 2 .N /, it follows that when the private exponent is smaller than 1 6 N 1=4 the modulus can be factored in time polynomial in log 2 .N /.
Since the attack is guaranteed to work when d < 1 6 N 1=4 , we know that the correct convergent in continued fraction expansion of e=N , call it c, should satisfy je=n cj < 1=.2d 2 / < 18N 1=2 . Therefore, only the convergents satisfying this bound (or close to it) need be tested. This allows us to quickly eliminate many candidates.
Lattices
A lattice L is a discrete additive subgroup of R n . Given m Ä n linearly independent vectors b 1 ; : :
Zº is a lattice. The b i are called basis vectors and L is the lattice generated by these basis vectors. Thus, L is the set of all integer linear combinations of the basis vectors. In addition, the volume of a lattice vol.L/ is the volume of the m-dimensional parallelepiped spanned by the b i . The volume of a lattice is basis invariant (that is, it is a constant of the lattice). When m D n, the lattice is full rank and we can compute the volume as vol.L/ D jdet.B/j, where B is the matrix whose rows are the basis vectors.
The main result that we need for lattices gives a bound on the size of smallest vectors in a lattice (a non-zero smallest vector must exists since lattices are discrete). The result, due to Minkowski, is given in the following theorem. We use kxk to denote the usual Euclidean norm of the vector x.
Using Theorem 3.2, we have a necessary condition for any vector x to be a smallest vector in a lattice. Notice that if x is a smallest vector in L then so is x. To simplify the discussion, if˙x are the only two smallest vectors in L we will simply say that x is the smallest vector in L.
We now briefly describe Wiener's attack as a heuristic lattice-based attack. where > 0 has been added to correct for small constants (that do not depend on N ) that were ignored (for vol.L/ and kvk). Thus, when d < N 1=4 , the vector v may be a smallest vector. If v is the smallest vector, then finding v will allow us to factor the modulus. Since xB D v, we can solve for x which reveals d and k. Thus, we can compute .N / D .ed 1/=k and factor the modulus.
In order for this attack to succeed, we rely on the following assumption 2 . When this assumption holds for the given lattice, we can then use the above method to factor the modulus. Even if the assumption only holds a non-negligible fraction of the time, the attack is still a success.
Of course, we also need to be able to find the small vector v in the lattice. For this particular example, with a 2-dimensional lattice, a smallest vector in the lattice L can be found efficiently. In general though, we will be interested in finding a smallest vector in an n-dimensional (full rank) lattice L 0 . In this case, the approach is to compute an LLL-reduced basis for the lattice which guarantees to contain a basis vector x 0 satisfying
Even though the size of this small vector does not necessarily satisfy Minkowski's bound in Theorem 3.2, which means that x 0 is not necessarily a smallest vector, it is often the case in practice that this vector is a smallest vector in the lattice. An LLL-reduced basis for an n-dimensional full rank lattice L can be computed with Nguyen and Stehlé's L 2 algorithm (see [17] ) in time
where M.x/ is the time needed to multiply two x-bit integers, and B is the size of the largest component in the original basis matrix.
Breaking RSA and its variants
We will consider an instance of RSA (or multi-prime RSA or Takagi's scheme) to be broken when the factorization of the modulus is known. There are several ways in which this can be accomplished. First, given a multiple of .N / (or .N /) the factorization can be computed in probabilistic polynomial time using the results of Miller [15] . Miller's result is much more general. It also applies to a multiple of .N / for multi-prime RSA and for a multiple of lcm.p 1; q 1/ for Takagi's scheme. If the exact value of .p 1/.q 1/ is known for RSA or for Takagi's variant, we can deterministically factor the modulus since
give a system of two equations with two unknowns which we can easily solve.
Next, given the private exponent d of an instance of RSA, we can factor the modulus since ed 1 D k .N / reveals a multiple of .N /. Similarly, this also holds for multi-prime RSA and for Takagi's scheme (since with d known we can compute ed 1 which is a multiple of lcm.p 1; q 1/). For RSA and Takagi's scheme, there are also deterministic methods that can factor the modulus given the public key and the private exponent. See [14] for RSA and [11] for Takagi's scheme.
Finally, given the constant k in the RSA key equation we can also factor the modulus (assuming that the public exponent is roughly the same size as the modulus). Assuming that we know g D gcd.p 1; q 1/, or more simply assuming that the exponents are defined modulo .N /, we can compute s D N .N / D p C q 1 given only e, N and k. Notice that reducing the key equation ed D 1 C k.N s/ modulo the public exponent e yields
where s is the only unknown. Rearranging, we can compute s since
where the inverse is well defined (as k and e must be relatively prime). Since the public exponent satisfies e N s, the value .N C k 1 / mod e yields s. With s known, we also know .N / D N s and can easily factor the modulus. This also holds for multi-prime RSA but not for Takagi's scheme.
Guo's common modulus attack
In [9] , Howgrave-Graham and Seifert describe an unpublished attack by Guo 3 on common modulus RSA with small private exponents. Consider two instances of RSA with a common modulus N and key equations
Guo's main observation is that these equations can be combined to remove .N /. Indeed, multiplying the first equation by k 2 , the second equation by k 1 and taking the difference yields
where all the unknowns are relatively small (when the private exponent is small). With this equation as a starting point, the attack then proceeds in a similar way as Wiener's continued fraction attack. Notice that dividing both sides of this equation by e 2 k 2 d 1 yields
which combined with Theorem 3.1, suggests that k 1 d 2 =k 2 d 1 , in lowest terms, can be obtained from the continued fraction expansion of e 1 =e 2 when the right-hand side of .k 2 k 1 /=.e 2 k 2 d 1 / is small enough. In particular, a sufficient condition for Theorem 3.1 to apply is given by
or more simply
When both private exponents are bounded by N ı (i.e., 0 < d 1 ; d 2 < N ı ) and the public exponents are roughly the same size as the modulus (i.e., e 1 ; e 2 N ), it follows from the key equation that 0 < k i < d i < N ı . Using these bounds for the k i , d i and e i , a sufficient condition for inequality (4.2) to be satisfied is given by
where > 0 is small and decreases with increasing N . Therefore, when this inequality is satisfied, we know that we can compute As discussed in [9] , Guo considers these two problems and offers the following solutions. The first problem is avoided by simply assuming that there are no common factors in the numerator and denominator of the correct convergent. That is, it is assumed that gcd.
Assuming that the d i and k i behave like randomly chosen numbers it is estimated that this will occur with probability 6= 2 ' 0:61. For the second problem two solutions are given. Assuming that the above condition for common factors holds (i.e., gcd.
One could try to factor
With the bound ı < 1=3
, the number k 1 d 2 is no larger than N 2=3 and is not expected to be of a difficult factorization shape. This is feasible for instances of RSA with a 1024-bit modulus but completely out of reach for instances with a 2048-bit modulus using the current state of the art in factoring techniques.
As a second solution, and the one we will focus on, one can assume that a third instance of RSA with a small private exponent and the same modulus is available. Here, the continued fraction technique is repeated with a different pair of RSA instances. Assuming that all the k i and d i are pairwise relatively prime, one can determine k 1 d 2 from the continued fraction expansion of e 1 =e 2 and k 3 d 2 from the continued fraction expansion of e 2 =e 3 , for example, which can then be used to compute
With d 2 known, the modulus can be factored (see [4] ). This method is expected to recover d 2 with probability about .6= 2 / 3 ' 0:22, under the assumption that the k i and d i behave as random numbers.
Once d 2 is known, we can factor the modulus since we know a multiple of .N /. That is, e 2 d 2 1 D k 2 .N / is known. Thus, given three instances of RSA with a common modulus and private exponents each smaller than N 1=3 , it is expected that Guo's attack will be successful with probability approximately 0:22. A sufficient condition for the attack to succeed is that the pairs .
and .k 1 ; k 3 / are each relatively prime (and assuming all quantities are random integers this is expected to happen with probability about 0:22).
Guo's attack in practice
The success rate of Guo's attack, in practice, is actually much higher than the theoretical probability of 0. 22 
where the gcds in the denominators split because gcd. 
We can simplify this further by separating the common parts of d 2 with the remaining parts as
ƒ‚ … 
In practice, we find that this condition is satisfied about 63% of the time. In particular, running 260,000 experiments (10,000 trials for 26 different values of 0:25 Ä ı Ä 0:5), we find that this condition is met (and the attack succeeds) with probability 0:629˙0:004 (where the 0:004 is one standard deviation) for 1024-bit moduli.
Guo's attack, as described above, however, does not use all the information available to it. We can improve the likelihood of success in two ways. First, notice that computing the continued fraction expansion of e 1 =e 2 , e 2 =e 3 and e 3 =e 1 , we can obtain the convergents 
gives a candidate for k 2 . In fact, for each .i; j;`/ that is a permutation of .1; 2; 3/, it is easily shown that D j D gcd.numer.c ij /; denom.c j`/ / gives a candidate for d j while a candidate for k j is given by K j D gcd.denom.c ij /; numer.c j`/ /. In each case the candidate will be a rational multiple of the correct value (just as in the d 2 example) with a similar sufficient condition as given in inequality (4.3). If any of the candidates are equal to the correct value the modulus can be easily factored. Given any d i , the modulus can be factored since a multiple of .N / is known. Given any k i , the modulus can be factored if we assume the public exponents are full sized. Thus, trying each of the six candidates will further increase the likelihood that the attack will succeed. In practice, we observe that the attack is successful about 93% of the time when the private exponents are smaller than N 0:33 . The attack continues to work with decreasing likelihood for larger private exponent sizes until the private exponent is slightly larger then N 1=3 .
In addition to computing the six candidates instead of only one, we can also exploit the form of the candidates. Letting D i and K i be the candidates for d i and k i , and using the example for D 2 from above as a guide for notation, notice that each candidate can be written as
for each .i; j; k/ that is a permutation of .1; 2; 3/. Simply rewriting these, we have
In practice all of the primed values (which are integers) are expected to be small. If none of the candidates are correct, we can perform a small exhaustive search to determine the primed values and hence reveal one of the correct d i or k i . If we assume that the primed values are each bounded by 2`, for some positive integer , then a search space of 2 2`m ust be explored for each candidate.
We illustrate the effectiveness of Guo's attack, with the modifications mentioned above, in Table 1 . For various sizes of private exponents (ı), we show the frequency of success of Guo's attack for RSA with 1024; 2048; 4096 and 10,000-bit modulus sizes. For each ı, we ran 10,000 experiments when the modulus was 1024 and 2048 bits, 1,000 experiments for 4096-bit moduli and 100 experiments for the instances with 10,000-bit moduli. Three random instances of RSA with a common modulus and private exponents each of size at most ı were generated for each experiment. The data shows the frequency that the attack was successful when only one candidate (d 2 ) is computed, when all six candidates (d i ,k i ) are computed and when a small exhaustive search is allowed for each of the six candidates (denoted by "Guess"). Instead of actually performing the exhaustive search, we considered the sizes of the numerator and denominator (in lowest terms) of d 0 i =d i and k 0 i =k i . If both the numerator and denominator, for any one of the candidates, were no larger than 2 10 , we considered the attack a success. In all of the experiments that we conducted, this additional search (of 2 10 for numerator and denominator) was sufficient to recover the desired values. The failures occurred when the convergents in the continued fractions did not yield k i d j =k j d i at all (and hence revealed no information). The bold data indicates the theoretical limits of the attack (and will indicate this in all subsequent data shown). As can be seen, the attack works quite well in practice. For private exponents smaller than about N 0:332 , the attack (with modest exhaustive search) was always successful. The success rate quickly deteriorated as the size of the private exponents approaches or just exceeds the 1=3 bound though. Notice that in the above discussion we did not consider the problem of actually finding the correct convergent. In fact, in all of the experiments for the data collected in Table 1 , we identified the correct convergent using the associated private information (d i and k i ) to save time. In practice, however, we will only be given the public keys. Nonetheless, we can still narrow the search of potentially correct convergents to a small number by finding a good starting point (good starting convergent). When looking for the correct convergent of e 1 =e 2 , for example, from the description of Guo's attack, we know from Theorem 3.1 that the correct convergent c will most likely satisfy
The theorem is a sufficient condition and hence we cannot rule out that the correct convergent might not satisfy the bound. Since the theoretical bound for the attack is ı < 1=3
and each k i < d i , we then also expect thať
Thus, when computing the convergents in the continued fraction expansion of e i =e j , we can ignore all of the initial convergents that do not satisfy this bound. In practice, we find that the convergent immediately preceding the first convergent that satisfies this bound is a candidate for the correct convergent (i.e., it often is the correct convergent). We will refer to this particular convergent as the good starting convergent.
In Table 2 , we show that, in practice, using this good starting convergent as our first candidate for the correct convergent works quite well.
For each value of ı we show C ave , C max and #C , where C ave is the average distance (in absolute value) from the good starting convergent to the correct convergent taken over all successful trials (so C ave D 0 corresponds to the good starting convergent being the correct convergent for each trial), C max is the maximum distance (in absolute value) over all successful trials and #C is the (rounded) average number of total convergents for each continued fraction expansion. As can be seen, the good starting point was always correct for instances with private exponents ı Ä 0:31 and this improves with increasing modulus size. For larger private exponent sizes some exhaustive search may be necessary. However, since the average distance is always less than 1:0, it is expected that only two convergents need to be tested for each continued fraction expansion. Since this additional (expected) complexity is so small, we simply assume that we can find the correct convergent (if it is present) with no extra costs. 
Efficiency
In Table 3 , we illustrate the runtime needed to mount Guo's attack for 1024-bit RSA and various sizes of exhaustive searches. The attack was mounted on an AMD Opteron 850 server with quad 2.4 GHz processors and 16GB of RAM using Maple 12. The time needed to generate three random instances of RSA with small private exponents and compute the good starting convergents was approximately 0:15 seconds in all trials and is not included in the runtimes shown.
The data in Table 3 shows the average (observed) runtime for a partially optimized attack and also the full worst case time for Guo's attack. Each value of corresponds to an exhaustive search of 2`for both the numerator and denominator of the candidate for the private exponent. The data shows average times and one standard deviation taken over several trials (between 1,000 trials for short runtimes, 100 for intermediate runtimes and 10 for the largest runtimes). The partially optimized attack aborts the exhaustive search once the modulus is factored for a given candidate but carries out the search for all three candidates of the private exponents. The full worst case data searches the entire 2 2`s earch space for each candidate. As is expected, the time for the attack increases by a factor of four when the value of`is increased by one.
Notice that the data for the attack when`D 10, which corresponds to the data collected in Table 1 , shows that the attack in practice (with a moderate exhaustive search) is both very successful and very efficient; taking approximately 10 seconds to factor the modulus.
Bound
Time T`(seconds) 
Multi-prime RSA
In the description of Guo's attack (and it's modifications) above, notice that once the equation
is obtained, there is no way of knowing if the equation was derived using two key equations for RSA or using two key equations for multi-prime RSA. Thus, the same attack and the same results hold for multi-prime RSA also. That is, we expect that the attack will be successful (with some non-negligible probability) when all three instances of multi-prime RSA have private exponents
where > 0 is a small constant that is independent of N . Here, we again assume that each public exponent is full sized. In practice, we have observed that the attack is actually slightly more successful for multi-prime RSA compared to RSA. In particular, the success rate for one candidate is about 0:65 and for any candidate is about 0:95 (compared to about 0:63 and 0:93 for RSA). We illustrate the effectiveness of the attack for small values of r and common modulus sizes in Table 4 . Just as with the experiments for RSA, we average the success rates over 10; 000 trials for each private exponent size for the 1024-and 2048-bit modulus sizes and over 1; 000 trials when the bitlength of the modulus is 4096.
Similar to the RSA, the good starting convergent is, in practice, on average at most one convergent away from the correct convergent. For private exponents smaller than N 0:325 it is always the correct convergent. Since the data is very similar to that of RSA we omit the data here.
This attack on multi-prime RSA is actually quite remarkable since it is the first attack (other than factoring) that does not decrease with increasing number of primes in the modulus. This follows because the attack does not use the relation jsj D jN .N /j < .2r 1/N 1 1=r which is used in all the other attacks. Since the size of s increases with increasing r, the other attacks become weaker.
Takagi's scheme
For Takagi's scheme, just as with multi-prime RSA, notice that Guo's attack is the same as for RSA. The only difference is that even when the public exponents are full sized, they are much smaller than the modulus N which is the case for RSA and multi-prime RSA. In particular, since the key equation is given by
it is expected, with high probability, that the public exponent will be roughly the same size as lcm.p 1; q 1/ (when the private exponent is small). For randomly generated primes it is further expected that lcm.p 1; q 1/ will be close to .p 1/.q 1/ and so a full sized public exponent will have size N 2=.tC1/ when the modulus is given by N D p t q. Now, from the derivation of Guo's attack Table 4 . Guo's attack on multi-prime RSA: Empirical success rate.
earlier, recall that a sufficient condition to obtain the desired convergents in the continued fraction expansion of e 1 =e 2 was given by (equation (4.2))
which can be rewritten as 2k 2 jk 2 k 1 j d 1 < e 2 . Since 0 < k 1 ; k 2 ; d 1 < N ı and e N 2=.tC1/ , notice that a new sufficient condition is given by 2N 3ı < N 2=.tC1/ , or more simply
where > 0 is small and becomes smaller with increasing N . Again, we used k i < d i , which follows from the key equation. The bound on ı shows that the attack is expected to become weaker as the multiplicity of the prime p increases (the parameter t ). It should be pointed out that when mounting Guo's attack on Takagi's variant, we do not look for candidates for the k i (constants in the key equations) since we do not have a method for factoring the modulus given one of the k i . Thus, we only try to compute candidates for the three private exponents.
In practice, just as with RSA and multi-prime RSA, the attack works well up to the theoretical bound. We illustrate the effectiveness of the attack for small values of t and common modulus sizes in Tables 5 and 6 . In particular, Table 5 shows the success rate for different sized moduli with N D p 2 q. For moduli of this form, the bound in Guo's attack is ı < 2=9 0:2222. For the 1024-and 2048-bit modulus sizes, we averaged the data over 10; 000 trials. For the 4096-bit modulus size, we used 1; 000 trials. As can be seen, the attack works quite well for private exponents approaching this bound.
In Table 6 , we show the success rates when mounting the attack on Takagi's scheme with 4096-bit moduli of the form N D p 3 q. For moduli of this form, Guo's bound is ı < 1=6 0:1667. Again, the data illustrates that the attacks work quite well up to private exponents approaching the theoretical bound. The data shown is averaged over 1; 000 trials for each private exponent size. In addition to the success rates, we also include the data showing that the good starting convergent is indeed a good starting convergent (just as with RSA and multi-prime RSA).
Howgrave-Graham and Seifert's attack
Howgrave-Graham and Seifert's small private exponent attack on common modulus RSA [9] improves upon Guo's attack in several ways. In particular, the attack can be mounted with only two instances of RSA (although it gets stronger with more), the problems associated with relatively prime quantities are not a concern and, most importantly, the attack (even with only two instances) is much stronger.
Even though the attack is a heuristic attack it has been shown to work well in practice when the number of instances of RSA and the modulus sizes are relatively small (see [9] ). Given n Ä 5 instances of RSA with a common modulus, each having private exponent smaller than N ı n , the attack can factor the modulus when ı n is smaller than given in Table 7 .
When there is only one instance of RSA (n D 1), the attack is simply Wiener's attack when mounted as a heuristic latticed-based attack (as described earlier). With only two instances, the attack is already much stronger than Guo's attack and with six instances, the attack is expected to factor the modulus when the private exponents are approaching N 1=2 . When there are seven or more instances of RSA, however, we note that the bounds suggested in [9] are too optimistic. We (will) argue that the bound is N 1=2 for any number of instances beyond six. We will discuss this in more detail later, but now we show how the attack is mounted for two and three instances to give a flavor of the general approach. Since we also want to mount the attack on multiprime RSA, we will re-derive the attack (for n D 2; 3) for multi-prime RSA. The attack is identical to Howgrave-Graham and Seifert's attack except that the bound for s D N .N / is left as a function of the number of primes r. Following Howgrave-Graham and Seifert, we let W i denote the key equation
1024-bit
which is the basis for Wiener's attack, and let G i;j denote the equation Table 7 . Common modulus attack with small private exponent.
which is the basis for Guo's attack. Recall that for multi-prime RSA, the quantity s D N .N / satisfies jsj < .2r 1/N 1 1=r N 1 1=r when there are r primes in the modulus. This inequality also holds for r D 2 (RSA).
First consider two instances of multi-prime RSA. Let .e 1 ; N / and .e 2 ; N / be two valid multi-prime RSA public keys (with e 1 ¤ e 2 ), each having their private exponent smaller than N ı 2 . Thus, the constants in the key equations satisfy k 1 ; k 2 < N ı 2 . Using the equations k 2 W 1 , G 1;2 , W 1 W 2 and the trivial equation
we construct a lattice with a known small vector. In particular, notice that the equations
can be written as the vector-matrix equation x 2 B 2 D v 2 , where 
The vector v 2 is an integer linear combination of the rows in B 2 , and is therefore a vector in the lattice L 2 generated by the rows in B 2 . If the vector v 2 is a smallest vector in L 2 then recovering v 2 will allow us to factor the modulus. Indeed, given B 2 and v 2 , we can compute x 2 whose first two components k 1 k 2 and d 1 k 2 yield k 1 =d 1 . Just as in Wiener's attack, this allows us to compute
which then allows us to factor the modulus (deterministically for RSA and probabilistically for multi-prime RSA with r > 2). Since the components of v 2 are not balanced, we can modify the equation by multiplying it by the diagonal matrix D 2 D diag.N 2.1 1=r / ; N 1 1=r ; N ı 2 C2.1 1=r / ; 1/, and considering the new vector-matrix equation
, where where we have ignored all constants not depending on N . This is further simplified as
where > 0 is added to account for the ignored constants. Letting r D 2, we recover Howgrave-Graham and Seifert's original bound of ı 2 < 5=14 0:357 . If both private exponents satisfy this bound and if v 0 2 is a smallest vector in L 0 2 and if we can find a smallest vector in the lattice (which we can efficiently do for a 4-dimensional lattice using Nguyen and Stehlé's greedy algorithm [16] ) then we can factor the modulus. Thus, if Assumption 3.3 holds we can factor the modulus. Again, solving for the vector x 2 reveals k 2 =d 2 which can be used to compute .N /. Now consider three instances of multi-prime RSA with a common modulus. Let .e 1 ; N /, .e 2 ; N /, .e 3 ; N / be three valid multi-prime RSA public keys (with e i ¤ e j ), each having their private exponent smaller than N ı 3 . In this case, a lattice is constructed with the eight equations: we obtain a new vector-matrix equation or more simply
where > 0 has been added to account for the ignored constants. If Assumption 3.3 holds and v 0 3 is a smallest vector in L 0 3 and we can compute a smallest vector in L 0 3 (by computing an LLL-reduced basis for the lattice) then computing v 0 3 allows us to factor the modulus. Just as with n D 2, we can recover the vector x 3 whose first two components k 1 k 2 k 3 and d 1 k 2 k 3 allow us to compute k 1 =d 1 , and hence .N /.
In the general case, when there are n instances of multi-prime RSA with a common modulus, a vector-matrix equation x n B n D v n is constructed with 2 n equations. The first equation is the trivial equation k 1 k n D k 1 k n , the final equation is the product of all the Wiener equations W 1 W n , and the remaining equations are products of various Wiener and Guo equations (W i and G i;j ), chosen so that the basis matrix B n is triangular. However, the choice of the middle 2 n 2 equations to ensure a triangular basis matrix is not unique and this determination becomes an optimization problem to maximize the volume of the lattice (see [9] for more detail on this equation determination). The last component of v n (coming from the right hand side of the equation W 1 W n ) will dominate the components of v n with size N n.ı n C1 1=r / . Multiplying the vector-matrix equation by an appropriate diagonal matrix we construct a new vector-matrix equation x n B 0 n D v 0 n , where the new target vector has balanced components. Just as in the n D 2; 3 cases, the diagonal matrix will leave the last row of B n unchanged (and so the final row of the new basis matrix will still correspond to W 1 W n ). Using Theorem 3.2, a necessary condition for ı n can be determined so that v 0 3 is a smallest vector in L 0 n (the lattice generated by the rows of B 0 n ). Following the general bounds determination from Howgrave-Graham and Seifert, it can be shown that if ı n satisfies
when n is even or
when n is odd, then the target vector v 0 n will satisfy Minkowski's bound (Theorem 3.2) for the lattice L 0 n . Letting r D 2 recovers Howgrave-Graham and Seifert's bounds. However, the bounds are not a sufficient condition for v 0 n to be a smallest vector. In fact, based on the structure of the basis matrix B 0 n , we can construct another necessary condition that requires ı n to be much smaller for large values of n. Consider the description of the construction of the basis matrix B 0 n given above. It is always the case that the last column of the basis matrix will always correspond to the product of all the Wiener equations W 1 W n , that this column is not modified when balancing the components of the target vector (since the right hand side of this equation is always the dominant component of the target vector) and that the basis matrix is always (upper) triangular. Looking at the left hand side of the product of all the Wiener equations W 1 W n :
each term in the expansion of this product is of the form Y 
Since all of the public exponents satisfy e i N , it follows that each component has (approximate) size N n . The size of the last row vector in the basis matrix, which has only one non-zero component since the matrix is (upper) triangular, then also has (approximate) size N n . This vector is clearly a vector in the lattice since it is a basis vector (being a vector in the basis matrix). Thus, if the target vector v 0 n is to be a smallest vector in the lattice, it must also be smaller than this vector. Since v 0 n has size N n.ı n C1 1=r / , it follows that another necessary condition (for v 0 n to be a smallest vector) is given by n.ı n C 1 1=r/ < n; or more simply
Therefore, the size of the private exponents must satisfy inequality (5.3) in addition to inequalities (5.1) and (5.2) if it is to be a smallest vector. When all of these inequalities hold, and when v 0 n actually is a smallest vector, finding v 0 n allows us to factor the modulus in the same way as illustrated in the n D 2; 3 cases. In particular, the components of the vector x n will have the form .h 1 ; : : : ; h n / where h i 2 ¹k i ; d i º. Since all 2 n possible combinations will be present, we know that k 1 k n and d 1 k 2 k n will be present (and defined by the structure of B n ). Thus, the value k 1 =d 1 can be found and used to compute .N / as described above. For RSA (r D 2), notice that inequality (5.3) implies that Howgrave-Graham and Seifert's attack cannot break instances of RSA with private exponents greater than N 1=2 (regardless of the number of instances present). Since the bounds imposed by inequalities (5.1) and (5.2) exceed N 1=2 when n 7, the bounds originally suggested by Howgrave-Graham and Seifert are overly optimistic in this range. Thus, for any n 7, we should have ı n < 1=2 as the bound. The bounds for n Ä 6 remain as originally stated. In fact, the experiments in [9] verified the practical effectiveness of the attacks for 2 Ä n Ä 5. Unfortunately, since the lattice dimension is exponential in n, mounting the attack for n 6 becomes computationally expensive (and hence was not done) and so the N 1=2 ceiling was not observed (experimentally) by Howgrave-Graham and Seifert or here.
For multi-prime RSA (n > 2), the bound from inequality (5.3) dominates the attack for almost all parameter choices except r D 3 with two instances, which has a bound ı 2 < 6=21 0:286 < 1=3, r D 4 with two instances, where the bounds match at 1=4, and r D 3 with three instances where the bounds match at 1=3.
We did not extend Howgrave-Graham and Seifert's attack to Takagi's variant. Our attempts only led to non-attacks (i.e., the bounds on ı are always negative). For simplicity, let the public/private exponents be defined .p 1/.q 1/ instead of modulo 0 .N / D lcm.p 1; q 1/. The obvious attempt is to multiply the key equation by p t 1 to obtain an equation
where s N t=.tC1/ . Using this for the W i equations, we can follow the derivation (for n D 2; 3 as above for example). Working through the details, the attack fails because each public exponent is of size (roughly) N 2=.tC1/ , which reduces the volume of the basis matrix considerably. Matching the size of the target vector to the volume of the lattice (by Minkowski's theorem) we find that ı < 0 is a necessary condition for the target vector to be a smallest vector in the lattice.
Practical effectiveness
In Table 8 , we illustrate the practical effectiveness of Howgrave-Graham and Seifert's attack when mounted against RSA and multi-prime RSA for up to n D 4 instances.
While the attack is only a heuristic, it works extremely well when mounted against RSA in practice. In [9, Figures 2-7] , Howgrave-Graham and Seifert show experimental results (success rates and runtimes) for up to n D 5 instances of RSA (with modulus lengths ranging from 200 to 700 bits). In Table 8 , we illustrate the effectiveness of the attack against RSA and multi-prime RSA (r D 3; 4) when there are up to four instances (n D 2; 3; 4) with modulus lengths of 1024 or 2048 bits. For each value of ı in the table, Success is the number of successful attacks out of 100 trials, unless otherwise noted. For each grouping of number of instances, the theoretical bound is listed in the final row (along with an indication if the attack can achieve this bound in practice in a random sampling of 100 trials).
From the data in the table it is clear that the attack works quite well against RSA (r D 2), which was already shown by Howgrave-Graham and Seifert in [9] . The attack almost always succeeds as the size of the private exponents approach the theoretic bound at which point the success rate quickly deteriorates to zero. The attack is successful (albeit with small probability) right up to the theoretical bound. When the attack is mounted against multi-prime RSA, however, the experimental limits of the attack do not reach the theoretical limits and this discrepancy seems to grow with increasing number of primes in the modulus (based on the small sample set of r D 2; 3; 4 only). Given two instances of multi-prime RSA, the attack is still a great improvement over single instance small private attacks (e.g., Boneh and Durfee's attack) though. As soon as three instances are known, however, Guo's attack is stronger. For r D 3, the theoretical bounds are actually the same but, in practice, Guo's attack is successful right up to the N 1=3 bound, whereas Howgrave-Graham and Seifert's attack works for private exponents smaller than about N 0:278 . For larger values of r, the theoretical bound (ı < 1=r) is always smaller than Guo's bound N 1=3 . Thus, when there are at least three instances available, Guo's is stronger in practice.
The data also indicates that the attack becomes less effective in practice as the size of the modulus increases.
Efficiency
The dominant cost of Howgrave-Graham and Seifert's attack is computing a small vector which is hopefully the target vector. For n instances of RSA, the lattice in the attack has dimension dim.L/ D 2 n and the complexity of computing an LLL-reduced basis using Nguyen and Stehlé's L 2 algorithm is O.2 3n .2 n C log B/ log B M.2 n //;
where B is the size of the largest component in the basis matrix (see [17] ). the attack is only feasible when there are relatively few instances of RSA (small n) since the complexity is exponential in this parameter. Table 8 . Howgrave-Graham and Seifert's attack in practice. Number of successes for 100 trials for each value of ı shown for n D 2; 3; 4 instances of RSA and multiprime RSA with 3 or 4 primes in the modulus. Last row for a given number of instances shows theoretical bound.
When the number of instances of RSA is fixed it can be shown that the attack is polynomial in log.N /. This follows from the construction of the lattices that are used which imply that B < N 2n . In practice, of course, the constants in the complexity estimate arising from the fixed n limit the feasibility of the attack to a small number of instances. We illustrate this in Table 9 , where we show the runtime of mounting the attack for up to n D 4 instances of RSA with a common modulus for various modulus sizes. Again, the attack was mounted on an AMD Opteron 850 server with quad 2.4 GHz processors and 16GB of RAM. The LLLreduced basis was computed using Victor Shoup's NTL c++ library. The values in the table are averages of 100 trials for n D 2; 3 and for 10 trials for n D 4. As can be seen, the attack is very feasible for small values of n but the runtime quickly increases (as is expected). Table 9 . Howgrave-Graham and Seifert's attack: Efficiency of the attack for various modulus sizes and number of instances of RSA.
Conclusions
In this work, we re-examined Guo's continued fraction and Howgrave-Graham and Seifert's lattice-based attacks on small private exponent RSA with a common modulus. We have shown that Guo's attack is actually quite effective in practice when a modest exhaustive search is allowed (2 20 bits in total). We have also shown that the theoretical bounds of Howgrave-Graham and Seifert's attack is N 1=2 once there are seven or more instances of RSA. This corrects the original bounds proposed in the attack. The bounds for n Ä 6 instances remains the same as originally given.
The correction to the bound in Howgrave-Graham's bound arises from the details of the basis construction as given in [9] . In particular, the equation W 1 W n leads to the second necessary condition ı < 1=2. Removing this equation (and possibly others) may still lead to an attack for private exponents greater than the N 1=2 bound. We are currently investigating this.
In addition, we have also mounted the attacks on two fast variants of RSA: multi-prime RSA and Takagi's variant. For multi-prime RSA, we find that in prac-
